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1. RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES 
Deposit insurance is the insurance intended to protect depositors and provide for their 
reimbursement to a certain extent in the event of the liquidation of a financial institution. The 
explicit form of deposit insurance is created by the legal rule determining what kinds of deposits 
of which institutions are covered by the insurance and up to what amount. The number of 
countries which have institutionalised deposit insurance has multiplied in the last four decades: 
there are more than 100 countries with such institutions today (IADI, 2017) in contrast to only 
12 countries in 1974. The institution of deposit insurance was introduced worldwide in order to 
improve the trust of depositors in the banking system and thus enhance financial stability. At 
the same time, deposit insurance encourages banks to accept more risks, which jeopardizes 
financial stability. 
With deposit insurance getting more and more wide-spread, research into the correlations 
between deposit insurance and financial stability is of particular importance. According to the 
basic theoretical model of deposit insurance (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), deposit insurance 
improves the stability of the financial system by strengthening the trust in the banking system 
and preventing bank runs. However, empirical researchers assessing the correlations between 
deposit insurance and the risk in the banking system based on the examination of various 
markets and periods arrived at different results: some of them found these correlations to be 
positive, whereas others found them to e negative.  
The basic theoretical model of deposit insurance (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) explains that 
deposit insurance prevents the so-called inefficient bank runs, when depositors do not run on 
the bank because of the inadequacy of the fundaments of banks, but only because other 
depositors do the same and they don’t want to lose their money because of the panic. There may 
be two possible equilibriums in this game theory model (Nash equilibrium), one of which is a 
desirable state and the other one is the bank run. Which one of the two occurs depends on the 
depositors' supposition, which in turn is influenced by a random factor. The presence of deposit 
insurance can prevent the adverse equilibrium and thus create added value for the society, as 
banks do not have to sell their illiquid assets in a short time under the market price.  
However, deposit insurance also has a negative effect: the encouragement of banks and 
depositors to assume more risks. Deposit insurance encourages depositors to keep their money, 
up to the deposit insurance limit, in the banks promising the highest rate of interest, regardless 
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of how risky the given bank is. Banks offering riskier credits can thus get financing more easily, 
as they can promise higher interests on the deposits, the demand for which will be increased by 
the insurance. These phenomena are called “moral hazard” in deposit insurance, which may 
mutually give rise to the development of a relatively riskier banking system.  
The authors investigating the subject of deposit insurance agree that the major advantage of 
deposit insurance, i.e. the prevention of inefficient bank runs may only be achieved at the 
expense of costs related to moral hazard. However, the majority of the empirical studies arrive 
at the conclusion that the negative impact of moral hazard are so high with deposit insurance 
systems of a high coverage ratio that they offset the beneficial effects of deposit insurance and 
increase the risk of the banking system on the whole (Table 1). 
Risk decreases Risk increases Mixed finding 
Gropp és Vesala  
(2004) 
White  
(1995) 
Garcia  
(2000) 
Chernykh és Cole  
(2011) 
Grossman  
(1992) 
Laeven  
(2002) 
 Wheelok  
(1992) 
Cull és szerzőtársai  
(2004) 
 Thies és Gerlowski  
(1989) 
Anginer és szerzőtársai 
(2014) 
 Demirgüç-Kunt és 
Detragiache (1998) 
No correlation 
 Demirgüç-Kunt és 
Detragiache (2002) 
Wheelock és Wilson  
(1994) 
 Hovakimian és  
szerzőtársai (2003) 
Alston és szerzőtársai 
(1994) 
  Karels és McClatchey 
(1999) 
Table 1: The direction of the correlation between deposit insurance and the risk in the banking system 
according to empirical studies. Source: Prepared by myself. 
 
A betétbiztosítással felmerülő er The moral hazard inherent in deposit insurance has been 
examined in the empirical studies so far only based on the correlations between national deposit 
insurance regulations and the risk indicators of the banking system. My own empirical study 
wishes to expend the literature on the matter with a different approach, by comparing the data 
available on credit institutions liquidated or existing in the period of 2014-2015 in Hungary and 
by analysing the composition of Hungarian depositors. 
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2. DATABASE 
The part of my research concerning Hungarian depositors is based on the database containing 
the depositors of the credit institutions liquidated in 2014 or 2015 in Hungary, which was 
analysed for the first time for a scientific purpose. The database of the depositors rescued by 
the National Deposit Insurance Fund (hereinafter: “NDIF”) includes deposit amounts (up to the 
reimbursement limit), the date of birth of depositors and the post code of their domicile. I 
supplemented the database with the Regional Statistics of the Hungarian Central Statistical 
Office (KSH, 2014) so that the domicile, which is a significant dimension in terms of the moral 
hazard, could also be analysed in a unique database in addition to the distribution of deposit 
amounts and the age of the depositors. 
I compared the combined databases of the depositors reimbursed by the NDIF with three 
different databases in respect of three variables: 
a) in the dimension of the deposit amount, with the cumulated internal database kept by 
NCIF of existing credit institutions; 
b) in the dimension of age, with the demographic statistics of the Hungarian Central 
Statistical Office (KSH, 2015); 
c) in the dimension of the settlement type, with the findings of the Household Monitor 
survey of the savings of Hungarian households by TÁRKI Social Research Institute 
(TÁRKI, 2015). 
I used the database of Magyar Nemzeti Bank subject to limited access to analyse the deposit 
rates of Hungarian credit institutions. The distribution of the deposit amounts was analysed 
based on the questionnaire survey conducted by the European Central Bank (ECB) in twenty 
Member States of the EU (HFCS, 2014). The analysis of NDIF, MNB, TÁRKI and ECB 
databases is subject to individual licence, which I obtained based on my research proposal. 
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3. HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH METHOD 
The purpose of my research is to explore if there are any signs of moral hazard in the case of 
credit institutions liquidated in Hungary and I am looking for a solution in my dissertation 
which could prevent inefficient bank runs but encourage depositors to be cautious at the same 
time. As shown in Figure 1, I investigated the topic from four different perspectives, based on 
nine hypotheses. 
 
Figure 1: Empirical research on the signs of moral hazard from four perspectives. Source: Own edition. 
Similarly to other empirical models in the relevant literature, my individual approaches of 
research only allowed me to draw indirect conclusions regarding the presence of moral hazard 
as the phenomenon cannot be observed directly. I expect from the combination of the findings 
of my analyses taking a new approach that we can learn more about the typical behaviour of 
depositors and banks in awareness of the deposit insurance based on the Hungarian example. 
I. Comparing interest rates of the liquidated and operating credit institutions  
According to the majority of empirical researches, moral hazard inherent in deposit insurance 
increases the risk in the banking system, which in turn generates in increase of interest rates. 
On the one hand, this is because banks with a riskier portfolio get financing more easily, because 
up to the deposit insurance limit, the demand for higher interest rates is not moderated by the 
possibility of losing the deposit. And, on the other hand, banks can assume a relatively higher 
level of risk when extending loans, because the depositor’s claims are to be satisfied by the 
II.  
Compare 
depositors 
IV. Compare 
average deposit 
amounts 
 in the EU 
III. Classify 
 liquidated credit 
institutions and  
their depositors 
I.  
Compare 
interest rates 
Moral hazard 
H1 
H2 
H3 
H4 
H5 
H6 
H7 
H8 
H9 
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deposit insurer rather than the banks themselves in the event of the dissolution of the banks and 
they typically charge higher interest rates on credits of a higher rate of risk. I supposed therefore 
based on the available literature and the Hungarian data available that 
H1: the credit institutions liquidated offered their depositors higher interests on their 
deposits compared to existing credit institutions on the average. 
I highlighted that liquidated credit institutions used to offer in Hungary higher interest rates on 
the average than existing credit institutions for any maturity, although the difference was only 
significant in the case of short-term deposits (H1), as I have established with a paired sone-
tailed t-test in case of a normal distribution of the interest rates and with Welch's t-test for all 
other cases.  
II. Comparing liquidated and existing credit institutions from three aspects (deposit 
amount, age, settlement type) 
a) Deposit amount 
One of the reasons for a difference between the depositors of liquidated and existing credit 
institutions in respect of the marginal distribution of the three variables (deposit amount, age, 
settlement type), if any, might be that the depositors of a certain financial standing (H3 and H4), 
age (H5) or place of residence (H6) may have been effected by moral hazard to a smaller extent. 
Before the comparative analysis, I tested the distribution of the deposit amounts in the 
liquidated credit institutions. 
H2: The reimbursement amounts display an extreme value distribution. 
Kallóné Csaba and Vajai (2017) established based on the examination of the matching of the 
various distributions (lognormal, gamma and Poission) that the reimbursement amounts paid 
follow an extreme distribution (H2) and, more specifically, the Weibull distribution the most 
(the distribution is strongly skewed to the left). Accordingly, I compared the distribution of the 
deposit amounts with non-parametrical tests. 
There is no information in the relevant literature as to the higher inclination of small, medium 
or large depositors to deposit their savings with credit institutions offering higher interest in 
awareness of deposit insurance, therefore my initial hypothesis is as follows: 
H3: There is no significant difference in the distribution of the amounts of deposits 
deposited in liquidated and existing credit institutions. 
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The result of the analysis was that depositors with deposits larger than 1 million HUF were 
more inclined to deposit their savings with institutions offering higher interests and 
subsequently liquidated than small depositors, which may imply that they were more affected 
by moral hazard. Based on the Wilcoxon rank sum test, this difference in behaviour gave rise 
to a significant difference in the distribution of the deposit amounts in existing and liquidated 
credit institutions (H3). 
Starting from the fact that the liquidated credit institutions cannot properly represent existing 
credit institutions in terms of their size (there is no large or medium credit institution among 
them), I also made the comparison in respect of a group of existing banks which only included 
small and medium credit institutions. Because of the absence of any previous literature on the 
subject, I expected no significant difference in this case, either. 
H4: There is no significant difference in the distribution of the amounts of deposits 
deposited in liquidated credit institutions and the existing smaller credit institutions. 
The difference is also significant in the case of comparison with institutions of a size similar to 
the liquidated institutions (H4), i.e. it cannot be explained by difference in the size of the 
institutions.  
Financing the reimbursement of deposits of higher amounts cost a lot to the Hungarian banking 
system: if the proportion of the amounts deposited with failed credit institutions had 
corresponded to the distribution of the total population, reimbursing the depositors of 
institutions liquidated in 2014 and 2015 would have cost HUF 94.5 billion less. 
b) Age 
The investigation of the difference between liquidated and existing credit institutions according 
to depositor age was intended to reveal if there was a stratum of clients which typically needed 
to be reimbursed. As there is no reference in literature to age influencing the affectedness by 
moral hazard, my initial hypothesis was as follows:  
H5: the distribution of depositors according to age is the same in liquidated and existing 
credit institutions. 
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Hypothesis five could not be tested in the absence of appropriate data1. The preparation of a 
questionnaire survey which may provide a reliable basis for estimating the age distribution of 
the depositors of existing credit institutions may be subject to additional research. Therefore, 
we don’t know if any age group of the depositors of liquidated credit institutions was more 
affected by moral hazard, nevertheless, it is important to keep the age variable for the analysis 
as a whole, because I classified the reimbursed depositors presuming that elder people tend to 
choose banks in their neighbourhood as they are less flexible in respect of travelling.  
c) Settlement type 
The differences between the types of settlements where the depositors of the credit institutions 
liquidated and those still existing came from may reveal if those who had to be reimbursed 
typically live in smaller or bigger settlements. People living in small settlements could only 
chose from a few credit institutions within their neighbourhood, therefore they can be “accused” 
less of taking advantage consciously of the protection offered by deposit insurance. As there is 
no reference in literature to the settlement influencing the affectedness by moral hazard, my 
initial hypothesis was as follows:  
H6: there is no significant difference in the distribution of the number of depositors in 
liquidated and existing credit institutions according to settlement types. 
The comparison revealed that the proportion of people from Budapest keeping any deposit or 
account with the liquidated credit institutions was much smaller than their proportion within 
the population. At the same time, people living in villages were overrepresented in the 
institutions liquidated. This difference may be explained in part by the fact that a significant 
portion of the credit institutions liquidated used to operate in small settlements in the country 
and served a local clientele. Another possible cause of the difference is that there may have 
been more people living in villages who made use of the advantage of deposit insurance and 
deposited their money with riskier institutions in the hope of higher interest rates. I applied both 
parametrical and non-parametrical tests to assess the significance of the difference, both of 
which established that the difference between the two populations in respect of the settlement 
type was not significant. 
                                                          
1 I presented my efforts aimed at testing to keep the logical unity of my dissertation.  
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III. Classification of the credit institutions liquidated and their depositors according to 
deposit amount, age and settlement type. 
a) Classification of depositors 
When clustering reimbursed depositors, I expect to find that the various clusters will imply the 
different levels of moral hazard.  
H7: The depositors of liquidated credit institutions can be listed to distinct groups based 
on the reimbursement amount, age and settlement size. 
Based on the information available regarding reimbursed depositors (deposit amount, age, place 
of residence), I examined their typical groups: four clusters could be distinguished significantly 
and objectively (H7) by means of McQueen’s k-means clustering. I used the multi-dimensional 
scaling/alternating least-squares scaling (MDS ALSCAL) to determine the optimum number of 
clusters.  
In my opinion, moral hazard could arise with a higher probability within two clusters, i.e. among 
the elderly depositors in the clusters “Millionaires” and “Savers”, living in large cities and 
better-off than the average, than in the other two clusters. This is because these depositors 
decided to deposit their savings in institutions which failed subsequently, although they could 
have choosen from the offers of many institutions in their neighbourhood. It seems probable at 
the same time that some of the depositors in both groups would have kept their money in the 
credit institutions that failed subsequently without a deposit insurance, too, because they trusted 
the given institution for some reason. The majority (91%) of the depositors fall in the cluster of 
“Stayers” or “Poor”, who hold much smaller amounts in deposit than the reimbursed total 
population on the average. “Stayers” probably chose a credit institution close to their place of 
residence necessarily, with regard to their advanced age, i.e. they may be “accused” less of 
having made a conscious use of the protection provided by deposit insurance The group of the 
“Poor” includes the youngest depositors living in the smallest settlements, who were probably 
forced to select a credit institution from the narrower choice available in their neighbourhood 
in order to be able to access their savings of small amounts on a daily basis. The more than 42 
thousand, most needy depositors in the cluster of the “Poor” could avoid serious liquidity or 
livelihood problems thanks to the reimbursement by the NDIF. I published the detailed 
methodology and the findings of the classification of depositors in my study titled 
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“Betétbiztosítás és erkölcsi kockázat Magyarországon” (Deposit insurance and moral hazard in 
Hungary) (Kallóné Csaba, 2018).  
b) Distinguishing between credit institutions 
Distinguishing between the credit institutions liquidated based on their depositors, one may be 
able to identify a credit institution with a clientele who displayed moral hazard to a higher or 
lower extent compared to the others. 
H8: Liquidated credit institutions can be clearly distinguished in space based on their 
depositors. 
I described the liquidated credit institutions with statistical means based on the characteristics 
of their depositors, then checked it with multi-dimensional scaling if they can be clearly 
distinguished in space based on their depositors.  
The classification of the liquidated credit institutions based on the characteristics of their 
depositors reveals that Széchenyi Kereskedelmi Bank is clearly distinguished from other 
institutions by its customers with deposit amounts high above the average, most of whom live 
in the capital city. We can establish based on the principles applied to cluster depositors that 
the customers of Széchenyi Bank were more likely to face moral hazard compared to the poorer 
customers of ALBA Takarékszövetkezet and Dél-Dunántúli Takarék Bank (DDB), living in 
settlements smaller than the average. 
IV. Comparing the distribution of deposit amounts in the European Union 
The deposit insurance limit is unified across the European Union to ensure competitive 
neutrality on an international scale. If there is a considerable difference between the average 
size of deposits in the individual Member States, that means that the coverage is too high 
compared to the average deposit size in certain countries, which in turn entails certain costs 
related to moral hazard.  
H9: there are significant differences between the deposit amounts in the EU Member 
States subject to the examination. 
I established by means of variance analysis (ANOVA) regarding 15 Member States of the 
European Union that there is a significant difference between average deposit amounts in the 
Member States examined, which may result in a relatively higher coverage ratio in countries 
with a smaller average deposit amount (e.g. Slovakia, Latvia, Estonia or Greece), which 
increases moral hazard on the side of the depositors and the banks alike.  The analysis is 
13 
 
presented in detail in my study titled “Egységes betétbiztosítási értékhatár, különböző erkölcsi 
kockázat az Európai Unióban” (Uniform deposit insurance limit and differing moral hazard in 
the European Union), which will be published in Statisztikai Szemle in the first part of 2016.  
 
4. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In summary, my research supports to the findings of international empirical research by 
establishing that the signs of moral hazard can be identified with some of the Hungarian 
depositors, too. The positive impact made by deposit insurance on society through both the 
prevention of inefficient bank runs and the reimbursement of the group of depositors in need is 
at the same time beyond dispute. In light of the foregoing facts I believe that credit insurance is 
a desirable institution in Hungary from a social and economic perspective alike, nevertheless, 
the possible ways of mitigating moral hazard are worth considering. I make suggestions as to 
the mitigation of the moral hazard based on and in connection with the recommendations found 
in literature concerning own contribution and the monitoring of the market players. 
I. Deposit insurance limit, own contribution  
The introduction of an own contribution is usually an effective means of maintaining market 
discipline regarding insurances. According to Pauly (1968), moral hazard can be reduced if 
there is an amount which is to paid by the damaged party in the event of damage. In the case of 
explicit deposit insurance systems, this own contribution usually means the amount above the 
reimbursement limit, which is to be borne only by large depositors. Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2002, p. 1371) highlight that “the undesirable effects of deposit insurance on the 
stability of banks are stronger where the coverage of the deposit insurance is larger”, i.e. in 
general, where the own contribution is smaller. Garcia (1999) then proves in connection with 
the foregoing that moral hazard may be reduced by the limitation of the coverage ratio of deposit 
insurance.  
I present in my dissertation that there is a significant difference between average deposit 
amounts in 15 Member States of the European Union (H9), which may result in a relatively 
higher coverage rate in countries with smaller average deposit amounts. Nevertheless, I suggest 
that the unity of the deposit insurance limit should not be broken, because varied reimbursement 
limits may distort competition within the internal market of Europe. I would rather suggest that 
the Member States with a smaller average deposit amount could be compensated for the 
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potential loss which may be caused by the moral hazard brought about by the relatively higher 
coverage ratio. For example, the differentiation between the deposit insurance contributions of 
the individual Member States might be one of the possible ways of compensation. 
The idea of introducing own contribution for deposits in excess of HUF 1 million may arise in 
Hungary as a possible means to mitigate moral hazard (e.g. 10% as in the case of BEVA) as the 
probability of a conscious use of the advantages of insurance is higher above this limit. 
However, with this solution applied, depositors might have still sufficient motivation to run on 
the bank in the event of a bank panic on the one hand and the principle of competitive neutrality 
within the European Union would violated. Nevertheless, it would be necessary to introduce 
own contribution to mitigate moral hazard, but in a form which would not cause a bank run and 
could be applied universally. I recommend to consider in reliance on the current findings of 
behavioural finance, that depositors should be paid as reimbursement the amount of the invested 
capital or maybe the risk-free return on it (e.g. the base rate of the central bank), rather than the 
high rate of return originally announced and containing a risk premium, too. I propose to 
evaluate the effects of this solution and to introduce it uniformly within the European Union, 
depending on the results of further research. 
II. Monitoring the market players 
The empirical researchers of deposit insurance unanimously believe that deposit insurance 
systems have a better chance of being successful in countries with a better developed financial 
and economic environment and stronger market surveillance. I tried to formulate suggestions 
as to the improvement of the institutional system and market surveillance based on the lessons 
drawn from my own research. 
a) The monitoring of banks: I have concluded based on the comparison of liquidated and 
existing credit institutions according to various aspects that it is worth continuously 
monitoring pricing deviating from the bank market average significantly (on the debit and 
credit side) and the distribution of the deposit amounts from a supervisory point of view. 
b) The monitoring of depositors: The number of persons who chose credit institutions which 
offered higher interest rates but failed subsequently may have been higher among the 
Hungarian depositors with deposit amounts above the average, because they relied on the 
protection provided by deposit insurance, even though they were probably better prepared 
regarding finances and could have chosen from more banks in their densely populated 
neighbourhood. In light of the Hungarian example, it may be worth paying more attention 
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to, and maybe also analyse by questionnaires, the deposit creation habits of persons with 
deposit amounts above the average. 
c) Countercyclical strategy: Anginer and co-authors (2014) found the negative impact of moral 
hazard related to deposit insurance to dominate in balanced periods and the stabilizing effect 
of deposit insurance to prevail in turbulent periods. I think that while the amount of moral 
hazard may be reduced by means of stricter regulation without increasing the risk of a bank 
run if the economic conditions are balanced, insurance coverage could be extended in 
critical times (just as we saw it during the financial crisis of 2008). I propose therefore the 
introduction of a countercyclical strategy in deposit insurance.  
d) Bank run simulations: My research has been the first to examine the distribution of deposit 
amounts on an international scale. This information may be used as input data for the 
simulation of bank runs. The observation of the total Hungarian population of depositors is 
supplemented by the analysis of the distribution of deposit amounts in 15 Member States 
included in the HFCS database (2014), which confirms that the distribution of deposit 
amounts is strongly skewed to the left and extended long to the right. This also means in 
respect of the European Union that a minor change to the current deposit insurance limit of 
EUR 100,000 would change the number of the deposits insured only to a slight extent, while 
the insurance obligation would change considerably. 
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